Redress compliance and choice: Enhanced Consumer Measures and the retreat from punishment in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 by Cartwright, Peter
 1 
 
 
REDRESS COMPLIANCE AND CHOICE: ENHANCED CONSUMER MEASURES 
AND THE RETREAT FROM PUNISHMENT IN THE CONSUMER RIGHTS ACT 
2015 
 
PETER CARTWRIGHT* 
 
 
ABSTRACT. This article examines critically the extent to which the availability of 
Enhanced Consumer Measures (ECMs) created by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
addresses the problems associated with the enforcement of consumer protection law in 
the UK. The article explains the genesis of the provisions by establishing the limitations 
of the previous law before moving on to consider the extent to which ECMs are 
successful in addressing those limitations. The article argues that while the availability of 
ECMs will potentially improve the ability of both enforcers and courts to achieve some 
objectives of consumer protection law, the measures raise some significant concerns. Of 
particular concern is the extent to which they signal a move away from prosecution in 
cases where that would be the optimal response, and so compromise the ability of 
consumer protection law to achieve some of its most important objectives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumer law in the UK has always comprised both public and private law.1 The principal 
aims of consumer law include protecting consumers from harm, raising trading 
standards, and providing redress where harm or loss is caused. The methods by which 
these relatively simple objectives are achieved are, however, varied and fragmented. 
Despite considerable attention being paid to the limitations of the criminal law, the 
objectives of protecting consumers from harm and raising trading standards have long-
been achieved primarily through the creation and enforcement of regulatory offences.2 
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The enforcement of these offences may be formal (through prosecution) or informal 
(through compliance strategies).3 However they are enforced, regulatory offences in 
areas such as consumer protection and environmental law have been found to be of 
limited utility in achieving the objectives they might be expected to achieve.4 Where the 
civil law provides enforcers with mechanisms for preventing harm (such as through the 
seeking of undertakings and the making of orders under part 8 of the Enterprise Act) it 
has also been found wanting. This is both because of the cumbersome procedures that 
enforcers must follow, and because of the limited remedies they could obtain. With 
regard to redress, emphasis has long been placed upon what has been called the 
“individual claims paradigm” with affected individuals expected to pursue their rights.5 
Whether it be enforced through the courts or through alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) the private law has remained central. This is a significant constraint on the 
achieving of justice for consumers as the transaction costs they face in seeking redress 
will frequently be prohibitive.6 As Leff famously commented: “[o]ne cannot think of a 
more expensive and frustrating course than to seek to regulate goods or ‘contract’ 
quality through repeated lawsuits against inventive ‘wrongdoers.’”7 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015, which received Royal Assent on 26th March, 
makes highly significant changes to these areas of consumer law in the UK. Much 
attention has been paid to its implications for consumer contract law, especially in 
reforming the private law relating to sale of goods, supply of services and digital content, 
and unfair contract terms. However, the Act also makes highly significant changes to the 
regulatory side of consumer law (what is perhaps more commonly called consumer 
protection law) through the creation of Enhanced Consumer Measures (hereafter, ECMs). 
These changes have major implications for the success of consumer law as a form of 
protection, as a way of raising standards, and as a means to facilitating redress. They 
therefore go some way towards securing some of the principal objectives of consumer 
protection law. They also potentially assist consumers to play the role envisaged for 
them by classical economic theory of making informed choices in accordance with their 
preferences and so exercising market discipline.8  
This article examines critically the extent to which the availability of ECMs 
addresses the problems associated with the enforcement of consumer protection law in 
                                           
3
 See R. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (Nov 2006) and A.J. Reiss, "Selecting 
Strategies of Social Control Over Organisational Life" in K. Hawkins and J. Thomas (eds), Enforcing 
Regulation  (Boston 1984) 
4
 R. Macrory Regulatory Justice. 
5
 See T. Wilhelmsson “Consumer Law and Social Justice” in I. Ramsay (ed) Consumer Law in the Global 
Economy (Aldershot 1997) 217.   
6
 Ibid. 
7
 A Leff “Unconscionability and the Crowd: Consumers and the Common Law Tradition” (1970) University of 
Pittsburgh L Rev 349 at 356. 
8
 I. Ramsay Rationales for Intervention in the Consumer Marketplace (London 1984). 
 3 
 
the UK. The article begins by explaining the genesis of the provisions by establishing and 
explaining the principal limitations of the previous law. It then moves on to consider in 
detail the extent to which ECMs are successful in addressing those limitations. The article 
argues that while the availability of ECMs will potentially improve the ability of both 
enforcers and the courts to achieve some of the most important objectives of consumer 
protection law, they nevertheless raise some significant questions. Of particular concern 
is the extent to which they signal an undesirable move away from prosecution in cases 
where that would be the optimal response and so compromise the ability of consumer 
protection law to achieve some of its most important objectives.9  
 
 
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM 
A. Protecting Consumers through the Regulatory Offence: characteristics and 
shortcomings 
 
It is widely recognised that enforcers have lacked the enforcement tools to allow them to 
achieve their objectives satisfactorily. The Hampton Report (“Hampton”) was established 
to consider how administrative burdens on business might be reduced by promoting 
more efficient approaches to regulatory inspection and enforcement while not reducing 
regulatory outcomes. Hampton made a number of recommendations, including the 
greater use of risk-assessments and better targeting of resources.10 It also 
recommended the establishment of a review of regulators’ penalty regimes, which it 
viewed as operating ineffectively, particularly as a deterrent.11 The review was 
undertaken by Professor Richard Macrory who produced a consultation document 
(Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in a post-Hampton world) which analysed the 
shortcomings of the existing law and set out a taxonomy of “Penalties Principles” that 
might be applied in future 12 This led to the final report Regulatory Justice: Making 
Sanctions Effective.13 The references to Regulatory Justice below are to the consultation 
paper where the principles were developed. 
Regulatory Justice concluded that enforcers relied too heavily upon securing 
compliance with norms by prosecuting (or threatening to prosecute) traders for breach 
of regulatory offences.14 The principal reason for this was that enforcers lacked tools to 
help them to achieve their objectives. Other studies have confirmed these shortcomings 
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in the context of consumer protection law, with particular focus on the difficulties 
consumers faced in receiving redress (broadly understood).15  
While not formally distinct from more mainstream criminal law, regulatory 
offences are said to possess certain characteristics. According to Ramsay, those 
characteristics are as follows.16 First, regulatory offences impose strict liability, tempered 
by statutory defences. Second, they employ fines as the primary sanction. Third, they 
are enforced by a specialised bureaucracy who will exercise discretion in the form of 
compliance strategies. Finally, cases are heard mainly in the magistrates courts with 
higher courts playing a role in the interpretation of the statute in question. To this, we 
might add two elements: that such offences typically require the defendant to be acting 
in the course of business, and that they may lack the stigma more commonly associated 
with the label of criminality.17 Regulatory Justice identified the following as particular 
limitations of regulatory offences. 
First, regulatory offences are inadequate as a deterrent.18 Traders know that they 
will seldom be prosecuted, and that when they are, penalties are likely to be low. The 
theory of optimal deterrence suggests that a rational firm will comply where pD>U, 
where p represents the perceived probability of apprehension and conviction, D the 
perceived cost of contravention and U the perceived benefit from contravention.19 While 
this model may not reflect accurately the motivation of many firms, to the extent that 
firms are purely profit maximisers or “amoral calculators” it seems unlikely that 
regulatory offences operate effectively as deterrents. One reason is that regulatory 
offences are typically enforced through “compliance strategies”. A compliance strategy 
has been said to have as its aim securing conformity with the law “by means of ensuring 
compliance or by taking action to prevent potential law violation without the necessity to 
detect, process and penalise violations.”20 This contrasts with a deterrence strategy, the 
aim of which is “to secure conformity with the law by detecting violation, determining 
who is responsible for the violation, and penalising violations to deter violations in the 
future, either by those who are punished or by those who might do so were violations 
not penalised”.21  The use of compliance strategies can be justified on a number of 
grounds. In particular, informal action such as persuasion or negotiation may use far 
fewer resources than formal action; but such an approach is also likely to create better 
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relations between enforcer and trader. Many contraventions of consumer protection law 
are accidental rather than intentional, and formal action may be a disproportionate and 
counterproductive response; this is particularly so where the harm is small and the 
trader is eager to comply. The predominance of compliance strategies does not mean 
that enforcers will never prosecute, nor that they will fail to negotiate with the threat of 
such action in the background. Ayres and Braithwaite conclude that the optimal 
enforcement approach is what they describe as “tit for tat”.22 This means that the 
enforcer only shifts from a co-operative to a deterrent approach “when the firm yields to 
the temptation to exploit the co-operative posture of the regulator and cheats on 
compliance”.23 This may reflect the approach of enforcers where consumer protection is 
concerned.  
Second, the Report suggests that prosecution is sometimes a disproportionate 
response to a contravention.24 While this may appear paradoxical to the first point 
above, it demonstrates the unpredictability of both prosecution and the effect of 
conviction. Well-informed traders are likely to know the maximum penalty that a court 
can impose for breach of a particular provision, and may even know the penalty that a 
court is likely to impose for such breach. However, the trader will not be able to predict 
the other impact that results from conviction, in particular from adverse publicity.25 
While the fear of such publicity might improve the operation of regulatory offences as 
deterrents, its consequences could be disproportionate to the harm and wrongdoing 
involved.26  
A third criticism is that regulatory offences are resource-intensive.27 Ogus found 
that in relation to consumer protection offences, trading standards officers would 
typically spend one day investigating a contravention, two issuing informal cautions, four 
issuing formal cautions and ten preparing prosecutions.28 Data presented to BIS by 
Surrey Trading Standards suggested that the average cost of bringing a criminal case 
was £1270 where guilty plea was entered and £3860 where the case was contested.29 It 
is difficult to assess precisely the impact this has on enforcement behaviour. However, it 
is reasonable to assume that enforcers will be reluctant to prosecute unless they are 
confident of success and do not have an appropriate alternative route.  
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Fourth, Regulatory Justice suggested that regulatory offences can lead to 
compliance deficit.30 One reason enforcers seem to find it difficult to secure compliance 
is that they are limited in the extent to which they can require firms to act in specific 
ways to bring themselves back into compliance and to ensure that breaches are less 
likely to happen in future. This is addressed in detail later. 
Fifth, concern was expressed that conviction does not necessarily reflect the 
stigma that should be attached to the wrongdoing in question.31 There are two concerns 
here: first that prosecution generates excessive stigma, and second that it generates 
insufficient stigma. One aim of punishment under the criminal law is to ensure just 
deserts, and inappropriate labelling can compromise this. Any conviction should, so far 
as possible, reflect the seriousness of the wrongdoing, and the principal elements of such 
seriousness are culpability and harm. Most regulatory offences are over-inclusive in that 
they are satisfied where there is little or no harm and/or culpability.32 However, some 
breaches of regulatory offences involve significant levels of harm and culpability. The 
regulatory offence is a rather blunt and inflexible tool which is ill-suited to respond to 
demands of a regime seeking to ensure just deserts, and the fact of conviction risks 
leaving an inappropriate label attached to the defendant.  
Finally, Regulatory Justice contended that prosecuting a trader for a regulatory 
offence does not focus sufficiently on victims.33 This is surely correct. In the context of 
consumer protection, prosecution has been widely regarded as an ineffective means of 
achieving restoration/redress.34 Victims will frequently not be involved in proceedings 
and in many cases will not be traced. However, as will be explained below, it is 
important to remember that there are now several routes to redress that were 
unavailable at the time Regulatory Justice was published, and so the criticism may not 
be as compelling as it was previously.35 
The shortcomings of regulatory offences, and in particular of prosecution as the 
means of enforcing them, loomed large in the decision to create ECMs. But equally 
important were the limitations of the other principal enforcement tool available to 
consumer protection enforcers, namely the ability to seek enforcement orders under Part 
8 of the Enterprise Act 2002.  
 
B. Civil Enforcement and Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002: Role and Shortcomings 
 
                                           
30
 Macrory para 2.27. 
31
 Macrory paras 2.24 and 3.25. 
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Part 8 of the Enterprise Act gives enforcers powers to obtain undertakings from traders 
and to apply to the courts to make enforcement orders against such traders, where they 
breach their legal obligations in a way that harms the collective interests of consumers. 
Breaches are classified as either “domestic infringements” or “Community 
infringements”.36 A “Community Infringement” is an act or omission which harms the 
collective interests of consumers and which contravenes particular legislation (including 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005 which was implemented in the UK by the 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008). Domestic infringements 
include breaches of many consumer laws, broadly understood, including those found in 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
The shortcomings of Part 8 have been well-documented, and it will be seen that 
some of these (particularly with regard to procedure) remain under the new regime. 
According to s.214(1) of the Enterprise Act, before making an application for an 
enforcement order an enforcer must engage in “appropriate consultation” with the 
person against whom the order would be made. The period of consultation is at least 14 
days beginning with the day on which notice is given. However, this is reduced to seven 
for an interim order.37  An interim order can be made where “it is expedient that the 
conduct is prohibited or prevented (as the case may be) immediately”.38 What amounts 
to appropriate consultation in practice is not entirely clear.39 Lewin and Kirk argue that 
the compliance strategies typically adopted by enforcers and discussed above (what they 
call “traditional engagement with traders”) will satisfy the requirement, as would 
interviews, particularly if it is made clear that part 8 action is envisaged.40 Consultation 
can be seen as an important element of the process in that it gives the enforcer the 
opportunity to be better-informed about the circumstances of the case of the trader. It is 
different from giving notice, and may be particularly important where a well-intentioned 
trader is receptive to taking steps to prevent contraventions in future.  
Under s.219, if an enforcer has the power to apply for an enforcement order he 
may instead accept an undertaking from the person. An undertaking will be complied 
with if the person does not continue or repeat the conduct, engage in such conduct in 
the course of his business or another business, and does not consent to or connive in the 
carrying out of such conduct by a body corporate with which he has a special 
relationship.41 In considering whether to make an enforcement order, the court will have 
regard to whether the person has given an undertaking and has failed to comply with the 
                                           
36
 Sections 211 and 212 respectively.  
37
 Section 214 (1A). 
38
 Section 218(1)(c). 
39
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undertaking. The court may, as an alternative to making an order, accept an 
undertaking from the person. Breaching an undertaken given to, or an order made by, 
the court places the person in contempt of court. 
The limitations of part 8 were in part demonstrated by how rarely it was used. In 
2011-12 just seven enforcement orders were made and 99 undertakings given, and 
these figures were not atypical.42 There are two main explanations for the reluctance of 
enforcers to use part 8. The first is that the procedure described above is so 
cumbersome that it provides a significant disincentive to using the provision. Recently, 
research undertaken by Karen Clubb on the mis-selling of mobility aids found widespread 
dissatisfaction among trading standards officers about the utility of part 8.43 
Conversations the author has had with enforcers have confirmed these conclusions more 
generally. However, this is not the view of all commentators. Lewin and Kirk describe 
part 8 as “a flexible, fast and elegant way of dealing with consumer detriment” where 
used properly.44 This appears to be a minority view. In the relatively rare event of a case 
going to court there will be significant costs attached. The London Borough of Brent, for 
example, has estimated that the typical cost of a civil case was approximately £3375.45 
This will provide a disincentive for enforcers to use the procedure and the known 
reluctance to go to court may encourage less reputable traders to drag out the process. 
As Baroness Crawley observed at the second reading of the Consumer Rights Bill in the 
House of Lords: “use of these measures has, in the past, been modest at best, through a 
combination of complexity of process, cost and risk to enforcers.”46 
An equally compelling explanation for the reluctance to use part 8 concerns the 
limitation in what it could achieve. Before the Consumer Rights Act 2015, part 8 did not 
impose any new obligations on businesses; it merely helped to ensure compliance with 
existing obligations. Traders could only be obliged to (a) stop breaking the law; and (b) 
agree not to break it in future. Perhaps the most striking weakness of part 8 in this 
regard was that it did not incorporate a mechanism through which consumers could 
receive compensation or similar redress. Although enforcement orders are admissible as 
evidence in civil proceedings, consumers still needed to seek redress through the courts 
or through an alternative means of dispute resolution.47 In addition, part 8 did not allow 
enforcers or the courts to require businesses to take specific steps to improve the 
                                           
42
 BIS Impact Assessment para 23. 
43
 See 
http://www.derbyshire.gov.uk/images/University%20of%20Derby%20Research%20Project%20into%20the%20
Mis-selling%20of%20Mobility%20Aids%20121113_tcm44-234260.pdf  
44
 In their view, difficulties have arisen primarily through choosing inappropriate cases and creating undue 
delays. Lewin and Kirk Trading Standards Law 45.  
45
 BIS Impact Assessment para 26. Trading standards officers now have rights of audience although it is not 
clear how frequently they will present the case. 
46
 Consumer Rights Bill 1 July 2014 1666. 
47
 Although enforcement orders are admissible as evidence in civil proceedings. 
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probability of compliance in future. Just as prosecution can be viewed as a blunt 
instrument to achieve the main objectives of consumer protection policy, so could part 8. 
To the extent that these limitations explain the reluctance to use Part 8, the proposed 
reforms may make it a more attractive prospect. It is to the reforms that we now turn. 
 
III: REFORM THROUGH ENHANCED CONSUMER MEASURES  
 
A. Objectives and Choices 
Difficulties with ensuring the effective enforcement of consumer law through the 
combination of prosecution and part 8 led the Government to look at reform. In its paper 
Civil Enforcement Remedies, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
identified the key outcomes it sought as follows.48 First was improving business 
compliance with the law; it aimed to achieve this by developing what it described as 
“forward looking measures to ensure the same or similar breach does not reoccur”.49 
Second was improved redress for consumers affected by the breach of consumer law. 
This would be ensured by providing appropriate consumer redress schemes. The third 
objective was to develop more confident consumers who are empowered to exercise 
greater consumer choice. BIS saw this as being achieved by “measures to improve the 
ability of new and existing customers to make a free and informed choice”.50 
To some extent, these objectives reflected the “Penalties Principles” outlined in 
Regulatory Justice.51 Macrory hoped these would build “a common understanding of what 
a sanctioning regime should achieve amongst regulators and the regulated community, 
and in turn… act as a framework for regulators when considering what sort of sanction or 
enforcement action to take.”52 According to the Principles, a sanction should do the 
following: aim to change the behaviour of the offender; aim to eliminate any financial 
gain or benefit from non-compliance; be responsive and consider what is appropriate for 
the particular offender and regulatory issue, which can include punishment and the 
public stigma that should be associated with a criminal conviction; be proportionate to 
the nature of the offence and the harm caused; aim to restore the harm caused by 
regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; and aim to deter future non-
compliance.53 These will be reflected upon in the context of the reforms. 
The Government identified two ways of meeting its objectives. The first was 
giving enforcers additional administrative powers along the lines of those contained in 
                                           
48
 BIS Civil Enforcement Remedies: Consultation on extending the range of remedies available to public 
enforcers of consumer law (“Civil Enforcement Remedies”)  (Nov 2012) para 4. 
49
 Ibid  
50
 Ibid  
51
 Macrory. 
52
 Macrory Making Sanctions Effective para 2.3. 
53
 Macrory box E2. 
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the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 (RESA) and the second was giving 
the courts additional powers in the making of orders under the Enterprise Act.54 There 
were strong arguments for some form of civil penalties regime. Macrory interpreted the 
notion of “sanctions” and “penalties” very broadly to include tools that involve some 
element of punishment and those which are focused instead on achieving an outcome 
regardless of any punitive notion. However, the Government decided instead to extend 
the range of remedies covered by Enforcement Orders. These provisions, known now as 
Enhanced Consumer Measures (ECMs) are contained in Schedule Seven of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 (CRA).  
 ECMs are central to the reforms the CRA makes to part 8 of the Enterprise Act 
and operate in two ways. First, when the court makes an enforcement order or accepts 
an undertaking from a trader, it will now be able to attach to them a range of ECMs. 
Instead of merely requiring the trader to stop breaching the law, the court will be able to 
require the trader to take a series of positive actions. Second, where an enforcer has 
agreed undertakings under Part 8, those undertakings may include ECMs. Again, the 
trader can therefore be required to act in a particular way, rather than merely required 
not to act in a particular way. The powers are open to all enforcers under Part 8 
including Which?, the only designated private enforcer. As they are based on the powers 
in part 8, they can be used to tackle breaches and potential breaches of a variety of 
consumer protection law. However, this article focuses particularly on their use where 
criminal laws are breached. 
There are three categories of ECM: the redress category; the compliance 
category; and the choice category, and the measures may be used either individually or 
in combination.55 There will be occasions, for example, where it is appropriate for a 
trader to be required to pay redress, change its conduct, and publicise the details of its 
infringements. This is particularly important, because, as will become apparent, the 
different types of measure have specific objectives and address different weaknesses in 
the enforcement regime. However, there are a number of constraints placed upon 
enforcers which may reduce the ability to do this in practice. For example, section 
291B(1) states that an enforcement order or undertaking may include only such 
enhanced consumer measures as the court or enforcer considers to be just and 
reasonable. Particular attention must be paid to the proportionality of the measure, 
taking into account: 
 
(a) The likely benefit of the measures to consumers; 
                                           
54
 BIS Civil Enforcement Remedies: chap 2. RESA was introduced as a way of implementing Macrory’s 
proposals but does not apply to consumer protection. 
55
 BIS Enhanced Consumer Measures – Guidance for Enforcers of Consumer Law May 2015 (“2015 
Guidance”) Case Study 3. 
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(b) The costs likely to be incurred by the subject of the order or undertaking (namely 
the cost of the measures and the reasonable administrative costs associated with taking 
the measures); and  
(c) The likely cost to consumers of obtaining the benefit of the measures. 
 
It is customary for proportionality to be demanded of enforcers, either in legislation 
or through other means (such as the Regulators’ Code). This is entirely proper. Indeed, 
Regulatory Justice emphasised that any sanction (a term that, as noted above, was used 
extremely broadly) should be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm 
caused.56 But if we look further at the limitations placed on some ECMs there may be 
some concerns with how practical these demands are. This is most obviously the case in 
relation to redress schemes. Each category is now examined in turn. 
 
 
B. ECMs: The Redress Category 
 
Section 219A(2) states that measures in the redress category are:  
 
(a) measures offering compensation or other redress to consumers who have 
suffered loss as a result of the conduct which has given rise to the enforcement 
order or undertaking, 
(b) where the conduct referred to in paragraph (a) relates to a contract, measures 
offering such consumers the option to terminate (but not vary) that contract, 
(c) where such consumers cannot be identified, or cannot be identified without 
disproportionate cost to the subject of the enforcement order or undertaking, 
measures intended to be in the collective interests of consumers. 
 
This category provides enforcers with a tool to address some of the limitations of 
consumer law identified above by providing consumers with redress. That redress might 
be in the form of financial compensation, or in the right to terminate a contract, 
presumably with the normal restitutionary consequences. Although not presented as 
such in the Legislation, redress measures are the primary form of ECM in that where 
taking action under all three measures would be disproportionate, redress measures take 
priority.57 As noted above, Regulatory Justice identified one of the weaknesses of the 
regulatory offence as being the lack of focus it placed on the victim. It also emphasised 
the importance of having provisions which aim to restore the harm that was caused by 
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 Macrory box E2. 
57
 2015 Guidance para 48. 
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regulatory non-compliance. In the context of consumer protection restoration, in the 
form of redress, is especially important. For that reason, particular attention is paid here 
to the redress category.  
 
The roles of enforcer and trader 
There is uncertainty about the extent to which traders or enforcers act as the genesis for 
redress. At the time of the consultation, it was central to the Government’s vision that 
the trader should come up with a proposed solution. The Government stated that its aim 
was that “the business would propose a scheme which they would agree with the 
relevant enforcer” although “where the business is unwilling to propose an appropriate 
scheme, the enforcer could seek a requirement through the civil courts that the trader 
offers redress to consumers.”58 This reflects one of the aims of Regulatory Justice– that 
businesses should be able to offer creative solutions to breaches.59 In its written briefing 
on the Bill, the Law Society argued that this was an important element in the rationale 
for ECMs but noted that the Bill had not made reference to this.60 The Guidance makes it 
clear that businesses can suggest solutions. It states, for instance, that the Legislation 
does not list possible measures, partly to enable the enforcer to choose the most 
appropriate measure but also to enable the business “to have the flexibility to suggest 
their own measures to put right the detriment they have caused.”61 The Guidance does, 
however, emphasise the primary role of the enforcer, stating that “[i]n the first instance 
the enforcer should seek to work with the trader that has breached to law to identify 
suitable measures to deal with the breach.”62 It later states: “we expect in most cases 
that the enforcer will propose the measures to be put in place.”63 
This represents a shift in the balance of responsibilities from the business to the 
enforcer. In some ways this may be understandable. ECMs are an alternative to other 
forms of enforcement action, so it may be reasonable for the enforcer to take an 
objective view of what, precisely, the trader should be required to do. However, placing 
the onus on enforcers in this way does have shortcomings. First, it might be viewed as 
an impediment to the objective of responsibilising traders. Regulation is most likely to be 
successful where it incentivises firms to comply with norms in the first place and to take 
responsibility for harm where it has been caused. Responsive regulation, as explained by 
Ayres and Braithwaite, recognises that traders will feel under incentives to do this where 
                                           
58
 BIS Draft Consumer Rights Bill Government Response to the Consultations on Consumer Rights June 2013 p 
48. 
59
 This takes the form of enforcement undertakings in RESA. 
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 Law Society Civil Enforcement Remedies January 2013. 
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62
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they see enforcers responding positively to appropriate behaviour.64 Generating an 
expectation that traders will initiate discussions and offer solutions helps to create a 
culture of responsibility. Indeed, on the assumption that traders are more likely to 
comply where they feel some ownership of the solution, it may be more effective to 
encourage and incentivise traders to develop their own responses. Second, it is a widely-
accepted criticism of both prosecution and part 8 that they are resource- intensive. 
There is ample evidence a recalcitrant trader can cause significant difficulties for an 
enforcer wishing to use Part 8, and while this problem remains under the new regime, it 
might be mitigated by giving traders some influence (at an earlier stage) over the 
content of ECMs. To the extent that traders rather than enforcers develop proposals for 
redress, enforcers’ (increasingly) scarce resources are protected.  
 
Proportionality, redress and deterrence 
In addition to the requirement for proportionality noted above, section 219B(4) states 
that an order or undertaking may include enhanced consumer measures in the redress 
category: 
 
(a) only in a loss case, and 
(b) only if the court or enforcer (as the case may be) is satisfied that the cost of such 
measures to the subject of the enforcement order or undertaking is unlikely to be 
more than the sum of the losses suffered by consumers as a result of the conduct 
which has given rise to the enforcement order or undertaking.  
 
This means that redress measures can only be used if the amount payable as 
compensation is likely to be no more than the losses suffered by consumers as a result 
of the conduct. It is the responsibility of the enforcer to decide whether redress should 
be paid, to calculate the loss that consumers have suffered and to calculate the cost to 
the trader of compliance.65 The OFT raised significant concerns about this.66 First, it 
doubted whether such obligations were necessary, given that enforcers are required to 
comply with the better regulation principles and the regulators’ code in relation to the 
use their powers. Second, it drew attention to the consequences of failing to quantify 
these elements accurately. If the enforcer underestimates the detriment and the amount 
of redress available, consumers may challenge the scheme or ignore it. If the trader 
alleges that the enforcer has underestimated the cost of compliance it may challenge the 
measures as being disproportionate. The OFT concluded that it would be preferable to 
adopt a model similar to that found in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
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where greater onus is placed on the business to carry out investigations, provide the 
enforcer with information and consult before establishing the scheme.67 Of course, where 
redress schemes are proposed, businesses will play an important role in operating those 
schemes, for example by identifying and contacting consumers.  
Regulatory Justice stated that one aim of a sanction was to eliminate the financial 
gain or benefit from non-compliance. The Redress measures focus less on ensuring that 
a trader does not gain from contravention, and more on ensuring that the measures do 
not impose a greater cost on the trader than the loss to the consumer. In the desire to 
ensure proportionality, it might be argued that sight has been lost of the need to 
eliminate any gain and provide appropriate redress. Moreover, by focusing on the need 
to avoid benefits to consumers being greater than losses to traders, the need for 
deterrence could be lost. 
One justification for placing such stringent obligations on enforcers is that the redress 
category is concerned solely with redress. It is not to be viewed as a punishment or, as 
the term is typically used, a sanction. However, it is submitted that ECMs should be able 
to play a role in deterrence. In this regard, they appear to fall short. A profit-maximising 
trader which believes it is unlikely to be prosecuted for a consumer protection offence 
may decide to cause loss to consumers safe in the knowledge that it will not be required 
through the redress category to pay more than the consumers have lost. Referring back 
to optimal deterrence, the perceived benefit of contravention outweighs (perhaps 
significantly) the perceived detriment. Most traders will not be quite so calculating; and 
there is evidence that traders comply with the law for a range of reasons beyond the 
threat of a sanction or financial loss.68 However, some will take advantage and the 
restrictions on enforcers’ powers appear to limit the ability for redress measures to 
ensure deterrence. While the principal aim of redress measures is to provide redress, 
given that they will frequently be used as an alternative to prosecution, it is important 
that deterrence is not lost. 
It is true that there are some ways in which redress measures may still incorporate 
an element of deterrence. First, the cost referred to in section 219B(4)(b) does not 
include the administrative costs associated with taking the measures. In practice, that 
may provide some limited deterrent, as the costs of complying with the measure may 
mean that a trader will be obliged to expend more through a combination of 
compensation and compliance costs that s/he received as a result of the contravention. 
Second, it is possible that the trader will receive some negative publicity as a result of 
establishing the scheme. The choice category (considered below) is largely premised on 
the desirability of consumers having information about the wrongdoing (broadly 
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understood) of traders, but that information may also emerge through the creation of 
redress schemes. The CRA makes clear that a publication requirement that is included in 
an enforcement order or undertaking is not an ECM, and businesses are often required to 
publish the terms of undertakings along with a corrective statement. Publication is 
important both to inform consumers of the trader’s wrongdoing, and to assist monitoring 
that trader’s conduct to see if undertakings or orders are breached. Regulatory Justice 
saw it is important that enforcers should consider what is appropriate including the 
stigma that should be associated with a criminal conviction.69 It should be remembered 
that ECMs will generally be used where there is no conviction, and may be used where 
there is no offence (although this article is of course focusing on where the criminal law 
has been breached). Negative publicity will generally aid deterrence but it is vital for 
proportionality and fair labelling, that it accurately reflects the wrongdoing involved.  
 
Redress measures in context 
It is easier for consumers to receive redress under other provisions than it was when 
ECMs were first being formulated. This is an important factor in assessing the costs and 
benefits of redress under the CRA. First, section 63 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 inserts into s.130 of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 an obligation for the court to consider making a compensation 
order in any case where the section empowers it to do so. Where a prosecution is 
successful, for example under the CPUTRs, and a consumer has suffered loss, the use of 
this power avoids consumers having to pursue the matter further. While this will be 
useful in some cases, it should be remembered that the power to make compensation 
orders has been available for decades but has been rarely used in consumer protection 
cases. The OFT Annual Report for 2011-12 identified that the 1860 prosecutions under 
consumer protection legislation resulted in less than £100,000 of compensation in total. 
While this relates to a period before the 2012 Act (when there was merely a discretion to 
consider compensation orders) it is not clear that the legislation will make a significant 
difference. One reason is that in consumer protection cases, the criminal courts will 
seldom have details of all victims at the time of sentencing. As a result, the 
compensation order may not be an appropriate method of providing redress. Another is 
that an important aim of ECMs is to take cases away from the criminal courts, so in most 
cases where redress would be appropriate there will be no prosecution for a 
compensation order to follow.70  
A second development is that the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 
2014 give consumers private law rights where certain provisions of the CPRs are 
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breached. Where a consumer enters into a contract or makes a payment, the trader 
engages in a prohibited practice (meaning an aggressive or misleading action) and that 
practice is a significant factor in the consumer’s decision to enter the contract or make 
the payment, the consumer will be entitled to redress.71 If the trader does not 
voluntarily pay compensation, the consumer will need to pursue the matter. This may be 
made easier with the implementation of the Directive on Consumer ADR by the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Regulations 2015. The Directive aims to give EU 
consumers the opportunity to resolve disputes without going to court, regardless of 
product, the service type or the place of purchase. Although there is no obligation on 
most traders to agree to use ADR it will in practice give many consumers an additional 
avenue for redress. One interesting argument that might be made is that the existence 
of alternative routes to redress (such as ADR) makes redress schemes disproportionate. 
However, compensation orders, the private right to redress and ADR are all best-suited 
to cases where there is one victim, or a small number of easily identifiable victims. In 
cases where loss is more widespread, ECMs are likely to be particularly appropriate. 
 
Limitations and innovations 
There remains a lack of detail about how redress schemes will operate, but some aspects 
(and limitations) are clear. BIS has stated that the remedies would be based around 
“mechanistic schemes to deliver particular outcomes rather than the outcomes 
themselves” and that “performance would therefore be based on the technical 
requirements of the individual schemes.”72 This means that consumers may not get 
100% of their money back through a scheme. For example, there will be cases when a 
large number of consumers have suffered different levels of loss. It may be judged in 
such cases that it would not be just and reasonable to impose a scheme, or that it would 
only be just and reasonable to do so if a trader can make consumers an offer based on 
the average of the loss.73 This would merely be an offer. There is no obligation on 
consumers to accept that offer and they can always pursue other means to obtain 
redress. It will, however, be possible for the trader to require that if a consumer accepts 
redress under the Scheme he or she waives the right to take additional action to recover 
the money.74 They cannot, however, require the consumer to waive any right in relation 
to other conduct of the business. Where consumers may not receive 100% of their loss 
this would have to be made clear to them. There may be other ways in which schemes 
are potentially less attractive than alternatives. For example, a redress scheme might set 
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its own remoteness rules to govern what is within its scope. It is not clear to what extent 
traders will be required to draw attention to all such matters, and it is vital that 
consumers are aware of their options. This does create the danger that consumers will 
be overwhelmed with options. One of the aims of the review of consumer law was 
simplification, but the redress landscape is arguably as complex as, if not more complex 
than, ever.  
One innovative aspect of the Redress Category is that enforcers may use it to pursue 
measures that are in the collective interests of consumers. An example of how this might 
operate is provided in the Guidance.75 In this example, a petrol station with a record of 
compliance was discovered to have faults with 3 of its 12 pumps, resulting in their 
dispensing a quarter of a litre less fuel than is shown on the pump. Working with the 
enforcer, the owner discovered that the faulty pumps had been used 5000 times with 
each customer being overcharged £3 on average. It was not possible to identify the 
affected customers, at which point the owner became uncooperative. The enforcer 
judged that it would not be just, reasonable and proportionate to require the business to 
try to compensate the individual customers in these circumstances. The low amount of 
loss per customer and the difficulty of identifying the customers in question meant that a 
redress measure to compensate them would not be appropriate. In cases such as this, 
ECMs allow action to be taken which removes the profit from the activity, but does not 
compensate the affected consumers. The Guidance suggests that in this case, the 
enforcer could bring a civil action to obtain an order for the business to pay £15,000 to a 
local consumer charity. In some cases an ECM might include a combination of 
compensation to consumers and a payment in the collective interests of consumers. For 
example, if the business were able to identify a proportion of individual consumers who 
had been overcharged, such as those who had paid by credit card, it would be possible 
to require the business to compensate those and to pay the balance (up to the amount 
the business had benefited from the error) to charity.76 
Some difficult questions are left unanswered. For instance, in the example above the 
trader paid £15,000 to a charity because it was deemed that consumers could not be 
traced. In other cases, those consumers who could be traced were compensated, and a 
payment made to a charity to reflect the difference between the compensation and the 
benefit gained. In both cases, the trader paid an amount to reflect the gain. But what 
happens if the other consumers subsequently come forward to demand compensation? It 
is presumed that they will be compensated through other means and it is foreseeable 
that this will happen. As explained above, redress measures cannot be used where the 
cost of the measures is unlikely to be more than the sum of the losses suffered by 
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consumers. In such a case the cost of the measures is not (it is 15k and the consumers 
have lost 15k) but the total cost to the business will be more if it also has to compensate 
individuals outside those measures. It might be possible for businesses to argue that the 
uncertainty about whether consumers will pursue action for redress makes a payment to 
charity which reflects the full amount lost disproportionate. It is submitted that such an 
argument should fail. It is important that the business in question does not benefit from 
its wrongdoing (even where that wrongdoing lacks any significant culpability) and that 
consumers should not lose their right to compensation. A difference can be drawn 
between the amount of the redress measures (in this example 15k) and the amount of 
the redress (15k plus redress paid outside the measures). 
It is important the traders take all reasonable steps to contact affected individuals, 
for example by advertising in national, regional or specialist press and by making use of 
social media. It will be up to enforcers and the courts to ensure that they do this. 
However, traders may be under incentives not to take such steps. For instance, they 
may regard it as simpler and potentially more beneficial to pay money to charity and try 
to gain some positive publicity for doing so. There is evidence that under RESA, traders 
will frequently make charitable donations (such as to environmental groups) as part of 
an enforcement undertaking.77 It should be noted that where areas such as 
environmental law are concerned, paying money to a charity may be more appropriate 
than paying to victims, because of the difficulty of identifying (let along quantifying loss 
to) them. Nevertheless, there are many concerns with using charitable donations as an 
alternative to punishment. It is not possible to do them justice here, but particular 
concerns include who decides on the recipient and on what basis, what accountability (if 
any) there is over donations.78 Furthermore, there must be concern that a donation is 
interpreted by the public as an act of generosity and goodwill rather than as a sanction 
for wrongdoing. Regulatory Justice identified one of the weaknesses of regulatory 
offences as being the failure of prosecution to reflect stigma accurately. It is vital that 
traders do not use these measures to gain underserved positive publicity.79  
 
C. ECMs: The Compliance Category 
Section 219A(3) states that the measures in the compliance category are: 
 
“measures intended to prevent or reduce the risk of the occurrence or repetition 
of the conduct to which the enforcement order or undertaking relates including 
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measures with that purpose which may have the effect of improving compliance 
with consumer law more generally.” 
 
The focus here is not on looking at how redress can be provided for past breaches, but 
on how future breaches might best be avoided. Regulatory Justice pointed to 
“compliance deficit” being one of the limitations of prosecution, with courts and enforcers 
limited in their ability (a) to require firms to act in specific ways to bring themselves 
back into compliance; and (b) to ensure that breaches are less likely to happen in future. 
Whereas Macrory saw these functions being achieved through compliance notices, the 
CRA envisages their being delivered through the compliance category of ECMs. As with 
the redress category, there is an emphasis on flexibility and this explains why there is no 
list of actions in the Legislation. However, the Guidance does identify some possible 
measures which appear to fall within this category, namely: signing up to a Primary 
Authority Scheme; appointing a compliance officer; providing better staff training and 
guidance; undertaking internal spot checks (and keeping records of these); collecting 
and acting on consumer feedback; introducing a robust complaints handling scheme; 
and signing up to a certified ADR Scheme and committing to be bound by its decisions.80 
The Guidance gives an illustration of how this power might operate. In this 
example, a consumer paid an online retailer an additional fee for next day delivery but 
found that the goods were delivered late. Enforcers investigated and discovered that this 
was the result of short-term staff shortages and poor staff training. Some steps were 
taken voluntarily by the firm: consumers were refunded their additional fee and 
temporary staff were sought. However, the firm refused to take steps to improve the 
staff training which enforcers believed to be necessary to avoid repetition of the delays. 
The enforcer sought an enforcement order to change and improve staff training and to 
designate a member of staff to act as a customer complaints manager. The Court 
regarded the proposed measures are just, reasonable and proportionate and that they 
would ensure there is no repeat of the breach.81 
There are a number of difficulties with this example. First, it is rare that such 
facts would arise. A trader that is generally compliant and responsible would be unlikely 
to refuse to improve staff training or agree that a member of existing staff be given the 
responsibility of acting as a customer complaints manager. A business might object to 
being made to employ an entirely new member of staff to take on such a role, but it is 
doubtful that this would be demanded of a small firm as it is unlikely that that would be 
just reasonable and proportionate. Second, the example concerns legislation that has 
been breached “inadvertently”. It is easy to see compliance measures as a more 
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appropriate response than prosecution in such cases. It is also clear that being able to 
add ECMs to undertakings makes them more useful than would previously have been the 
case. However, it will still be easier for enforcers to deal with such situations through 
informal means such as education and advice and, where breaches are inadvertent, they 
are likely to be resolved in this way. The compliance strategies that provide the basis of 
so much enforcement activity will remain the norm. Some cases will lead to 
undertakings, as the enforcer may want to firm up the traders good intentions. But 
relatively few are likely to lead to enforcement orders being sought, particularly given 
the procedural obstacles to such orders discussed earlier.  
The compliance category appears to address a number of concerns with the previous 
law. Its flexibility is perhaps its greatest strength, allowing it to be shaped to be 
responsive to the circumstances of the breach. One criticism of previous law is that it did 
not focus sufficiently on changing behaviour. The compliance category has changing 
behaviour at its core, not through deterrence, but through specifying what is necessary 
for future compliance This should reduce what Regulatory Justice referred to as 
compliance deficit. But some concerns remain. One is that whether the process is 
resource-intensive depends to a large extent how the trader engages with it. As noted 
above, if enforcers are expected to come up with solutions, there is a danger that 
traders may act in ways that make it difficult for resolution to be achieved. While this is 
less likely in cases where legislation is breached inadvertently and the trader generally 
displays a willingness to comply, some traders will not be inclined to be so co-operative. 
Enforcers may not be able to commit the resources they would like to pursue matters 
further and thus may be under incentives to agree to measures that are less than 
optimal. Where measures are proposed by the enforcer, there is likely to be debate over 
the reasonableness and proportionality of the proposals. It is up to the enforcer to 
quantify matters in order to be able to establish proportionality, but it has been noted 
that this will be very difficult in practice. An enforcer may well believe that a trader’s 
protests are disingenuous, but will find it difficult to prove that. So long as it is up to the 
enforcer to demonstrate that proposals are not unjust unfair or disproportionate, this 
problem will remain. 
 
D. ECMs: The Choice Category 
Section 219A(4) states that measures in the choice category are: “measures intended to 
enable consumers to choose more effectively between persons supplying or seeking to 
supply goods or services.” The rationale for the choice category (labelled curiously as 
“Consumer Information Measures” in the Guidance) was said to be the Government’s 
enthusiasm for seeing more confident consumers who are empowered to exercise 
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greater consumer choice and thus improve the functioning of the relevant market.82 In 
the Guidance, the example is of a business that described itself as closing down and 
offering price reduction of 25% “this weekend only”. In fact, there was no price 
reduction and the business was not closing down.83 In the example, a court order was 
obtained requiring the business to display notices in store, on the website, on social 
media and in the local press notifying consumers of their actions. 
The principal focus of the choice category appears to be upon communicating 
negative information about a business to consumers in order to assist them in exerting 
market discipline. This is a particularly interesting power and needs to be viewed 
through the lens of regulated adverse publicity (hereafter adverse publicity).84 It has 
been argued that adverse publicity can play two roles in consumer protection law and 
policy: it can operate as a sanction in its own right; and it can play a role in helping 
consumers to exert market discipline by making informed choices about suppliers.85 In 
relation to the first of these, enforcers use negative publicity as a sanction under a 
number of regulatory regimes, with the publicity forming either the whole, or a part of 
the sting of the penalty. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) issues 
public censure under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as a formal 
disciplinary tool, and may also use adverse publicity alongside another sanction (for 
example when it issues a press release following the imposition of a financial penalty). 
The basis for using adverse publicity as a sanction could be viewed as just deserts, but is 
more likely to be explained on the basis of deterrence. Many traders will fear the impact 
of adverse publicity and where they are motivated solely by profit the threat of such 
publicity may deter potential wrongdoing. Indeed, the Hampton Review suggested that 
reputational sanctions worked particularly well in the area of consumer protection.86  
It is the second role of adverse publicity, that of helping consumers to make 
informed choices, which more obviously forms the basis of choice measures. In classical 
economic theory, consumers make choices in accordance with their preferences in an 
environment where they have a wide choice of suppliers and products and perfect (or 
optimal) information upon which to make that choice.87 It is unrealistic to expect these 
factors to be present in all (or indeed many) markets, but adverse publicity through 
choice measures may help to fill some information gaps. Choice measures may help to 
ensure that consumers are informed about matters of importance to them. To make 
informed choices, consumers are said to need information about price, quality and terms 
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of trade and an unregulated market will not always provide this.88 Choice measures can 
be used to disclose information about the quality (broadly understood) of the provider, 
for example by informing consumers about wrongdoing. The consumer for whom the 
integrity or competence of a supplier is important can thus be informed about that.  
When making its original case for reform, the Government argued that there was 
a gap in consumer information “about where companies have broken the law or failed to 
offer a good service.”89 Choice measures will only be used where there is a breach of the 
law. They will not, therefore, be appropriate in all cases of, say, poor service. This might 
be viewed as a regrettable limitation. Brooker, for example, argues, that “as a matter of 
principle, consumers have a right to know when the behaviour of a business casts 
serious doubts on its integrity or competence.”90  Choice remedies might appear only to 
go so far towards addressing this because of their being rooted in a breach of the law. 
However, it should be remembered that the consumer laws that form the basis of ECMs 
are extremely broad, even where, as in this article, the focus is on the criminal law. The 
CPUTRs, for example, prohibit a wide range of wrongdoing. As well as banning 
misleading actions and omissions, aggressive commercial practices and a range of 
specific matters, they state that a commercial practice is unfair if it “contravenes the 
requirements of professional diligence and it materially distorts or is likely to materially 
distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product.” 
According to regulation 2(1), “professional diligence” means: 
 
“the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected 
to exercise towards consumers which is commensurate with either 
 
(a) honest market practice in the trader’s field of activity; or 
(b) the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity.” 
 
Conduct that reveals a lack of integrity will be well-suited to choice measures, 
particularly where the basis of the choice remedy is the need to name and shame the 
trader. Whether evidence of incompetence is fitting for a choice remedy is less clear. The 
requirement of professional diligence is probably broad enough to cover this, and as has 
been noted above, an argument for informing consumers about competence as well as 
integrity.91 To the extent that they concern competence, choice remedies must be used 
with some care. For example, where traders are flagged on a naming and shaming 
                                           
88
 Ibid. 
89
 Civil Enforcement Remedies para 3.22  
90
 S. Brooker Regulation and Reputation (London 2006) p 7 
91
 Unusually the professional diligence provision requires proof of mens rea, although what precisely that entails 
remains unclear. See P. Cartwright “Unfair Commercial Practices and the Future of the Criminal Law” [2010] 
(7) JBL, 619. 
 23 
 
website, care needs to be taken to identify how, precisely, they have fallen short. For 
them to be “shamed” there has to be some wrongdoing deserving of such shame, and it 
is easy for consumers to misinterpret adverse publicity. The distinction between naming 
and shaming websites, and customer review/feedback sites is by no means a clear one. 
Reference was made above to the danger that prosecution will sometimes be a 
disproportionate response to breach, and one reason for this is that it might be taken to 
imply stigma when such stigma was not deserved. Traders may, of course, challenge 
orders which contain ECMs on the basis of their being disproportionate, but one problem 
with adverse publicity is that its impact is difficult to quantify, particularly in advance. 
It is worth digging a little more deeply into the issue of proportionality here. As 
noted above, ECMs must be just, reasonable and proportionate. Where an enforcer seeks 
an undertaking, it is likely that there will be discussion about the justice, reasonableness 
and proportionality of what is being proposed during the process of consultation. Where 
an enforcement order is sought, the trader may challenge this. This occurred in Office of 
Fair Trading v Purely Creative and Others where the defendants argued that they had 
not breached the relevant legislation (in this case the CPUTRs) and, in the alternative, 
that the order sought went far beyond that required to secure compliance and was too 
generalised for the defendants to know what they were to be prohibited from doing.92 
Where an order is sought, it will mean either that it has not been possible to obtain 
assurances or that assurances obtained have been breached. The court will be able to 
take a range of factors into account when deciding whether an order might be unjust, 
unreasonable or disproportionate. The decided cases on enforcement orders are not 
particularly helpful as they do not concern ECMs. The lack of detail in legislation as to 
what ECMs may require is deliberate so as to allow a maximum degree of flexibility. As 
has been shown, the Guidance provides some assistance, but significant doubt remains 
about how willing the courts will be to make orders which place what might be viewed as 
onerous demands on traders. One difficulty is that the Guidance provides relatively 
obvious examples of conduct that would justify orders containing ECMs: a garage owner 
who becomes uncooperative after over-changing customers; an online retailer which 
refuses to improve staff training after breaching a promise of next day delivery; and a 
business that describes itself as offering a price reduction and closing down when neither 
is true. The respective requirements in the orders appear eminently reasonable: 
payment of the amount wrongly obtained to a local charity; improving staff training and 
designating a member of staff as consumer complaints manager; and requiring the 
business to display notices in store, on the website, on social media and in the local 
press notifying consumers of what they have done wrong. There will be far more difficult 
cases in practice where the court will have to consider the impact on the trader and the 
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benefit to consumers in far more detail to ascertain whether the order might be unjust, 
unreasonable or disproportionate. Particular difficulty is likely to arise where the enforcer 
seeks an order to use ECMs in combination. It was noted above that while redress 
measures will typically take precedence when using ECMs in combination might be 
disproportionate, it will sometimes be possible to use all three measures in combination. 
It is important that the courts show a willingness to accept such measures where 
significant benefits would be obtained. It should be remembered that the different 
categories of ECM have discrete and important objectives. Redress measures are largely 
concerned with compensation; compliance measures with reducing the probability of 
further contraventions and choice measures with improving the ability of consumer to 
make informed choices and exert market discipline. It is perhaps where choice measures 
form part of the order that disproportionality is most likely to arise. This is because it is 
the measure whose impact is most difficult to predict. While there is evidence that 
similar powers can work well as a deterrent, and as such as a way of raising standards 
and improving compliance, this is partly because of the danger that they might operate 
in a disproportionate manner.93 Literature on adverse publicity reveals significant 
concern that the impact of negative information can be disproportionate.94 It may be 
that where choice measures form part of an enforcement order that traders will have the 
best chance of challenge on the bases of justice, reasonableness and proportionality.  
A further point is that if there is significant wrongdoing we might expect more 
explicit punishment. In particular, where conduct is deserving of shame, we might 
expect prosecution to follow so as to reflect that.95 It has been noted that adverse 
publicity can operate as a form of punishment, but there is a reluctance to view ECMs in 
this way. It is to the relationship between ECMs, prosecution and punishment that we 
now turn. 
 
IV. ECMs, PROSECUTION AND THE RETREAT FROM PUNISHMENT 
 
When ECMs were first proposed there was considerable doubt about whether they could 
be used alongside prosecution. The Government was eager to move cases from criminal 
to civil courts and, where undertakings were secured by enforcers, out of the courts 
altogether. One sentence in the Consultation was a particular cause for concern: “[t]he 
option of achieving remedies of this type may only be appropriate [my emphasis] where 
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there is no wider public interest in criminal prosecution.”96 This implied that prosecution 
and the securing of ECMs were incompatible.97 This was extremely concerning.  
As has been explained above, ECMs play an important role in addressing many of 
the shortcomings associated with the enforcement of consumer protection law. Despite 
their limitations, they will make it easier for courts and enforcers to secure redress, 
achieve compliance and facilitate choice. But they do not sanction the trader, in the 
sense of imposing a punishment. There will be many cases where the imposition of 
punishment is not only desirable but essential because of the wrongdoing involved. Were 
prosecution to be unavailable alongside ECMs, how should enforcers approach a trader 
who engaged in conduct that undoubtedly warranted a criminal penalty, but which also 
led to significant loss to consumers? Denying access to ECMs on the basis that a 
prosecution is necessary would be perverse. Enforcers have always been able to use Part 
8 alongside criminal prosecution, but the Government appeared not to appreciate this. In 
its response to consultations, the Government stated that “as an alternative [my 
emphasis] to criminal prosecution” consumer law enforcers can seek an Enforcement 
Order.”98 
The Guidance now makes clear that while in most cases where the measures are 
appropriate they will be an alternative to criminal prosecution, “there may be cases 
where the offences are serious enough to warrant them being used in conjunction with 
criminal prosecution”.99 A case study in the Guidance gives an example of how 
prosecution might be used alongside ECMs. It concerns a business selling mobility aids 
through a combination of cold calling and high pressure doorstep selling. In addition the 
products supplied were often not fit for purpose and priced at an amount higher than 
that originally quoted.100 The company and its directors were prosecuted and a 
conviction was achieved. The enforcer then obtained an enforcement order under the 
redress category. The 20 consumers who wanted to return their mobility aid and obtain 
a refund were able to do so, while the five consumers who wanted to keep their aid 
received the difference between the price quoted and the price paid.  
The decision to allow prosecution to be taken alongside the ECMs is undoubtedly 
the correct one, and the example given is one where prosecution and ECMs should be 
able to work together. But the reluctance of the Government for the two to be combined 
remains a deep cause for concern. The desire to move cases from the criminal courts is 
understandable, and there is little doubt that there will be breaches of consumer 
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protection law that do not warrant prosecution.101 But it far from clear that the majority 
of the cases that currently lead to prosecution should be dealt with outside the criminal 
process. Enforcers exercise considerable discretion before deciding to prosecute, taking 
into account a range of factors such as the culpability and attitude of the trader and the 
degree of harm caused.102 As a consequence, many of the prosecutions for consumer 
protection offences that currently take place are those where the enforcer believes 
significant culpability to be present. This will not always be apparent to those who are 
not directly involved with the case. Moreover, because the offences are generally of strict 
liability, mens rea will not be central to guilt.103  
There is a significant danger that in the move towards ECMs, we lose the benefits 
that prosecution brings. Compelling arguments can be made to defend the use of 
prosecution in the context of consumer protection law, particularly if we think about the 
rationales for the imposition of punishment. Two aims are particularly relevant: 
retribution (particularly in the form of just deserts) and changing behaviour (particularly 
through deterrence).  
ECMs are not punishments and they can be used where the language of 
punishment is not appropriate. However, where consumer protection law is breached, 
punishment frequently is appropriate. A primary aim of punishment is retribution, 
usually expressed as “just deserts”.104 A punishment is imposed to reflect the 
wrongdoing in which the trader has engaged. Indeed, Regulatory Justice argued that an 
aim of a penalty is to be responsive and that this involves considering what is 
appropriate for the particular offender and regulatory issue. It was recognised that this 
can include punishment and the public stigma that should be associated with a criminal 
conviction. If cases are diverted from the criminal courts to negotiations between 
enforcer and trader and (occasionally) from criminal to civil courts there is a danger that 
this is lost. Appropriate labelling is particularly important in the most serious cases, i.e. 
where there is significant harm and/or significant culpability. It was suggested above 
that the Government’s calls for the criminal law to be reserved for “out and out rogues” 
is mistaken from the perspective of just deserts. There are other cases where the label 
of criminality is appropriately imposed in the absence of traditional, subjective mens rea, 
in the form of intention or dishonesty. An example might be where the harm caused is 
substantial and the trader clearly should have done more to take care. Traders who 
breach norms carelessly but unintentionally have been characterised by Kagan and 
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Scholz as the “organisationally incompetent”.105 Not all incompetence justifies a criminal 
label, but some does. That the criminal law has a role in tackling traders who could be 
expected to do more is recognized through offences that impose objective forms of mens 
rea (such as gross negligence manslaughter and corporate killing) and also through strict 
liability offences which are subject to due diligence defences. The offences contained in 
the CPRs are examples of this; the criminal law states, in effect, that D should have done 
more and is being punished for failure to act in an appropriate manner. This can be 
justified in part on the basis of just deserts. Many cases of incompetence will be diverted 
from the criminal courts (as in practice they have been for decades). But if just deserts 
and appropriate labelling are to be achieved, those involving the most serious neglect 
should remain.  
A second aim of imposing punishment/penalties is to change behaviour. The 
extent to which ECMs achieve this has been discussed above, particularly in the context 
of compliance measures. Traditional theories of punishment can be divided between 
those that are consequentialist and those that are non-consequentialist. Retribution is a 
non-consequentialist theory; the punishment is imposed to reflect the defendant’s 
wrongdoing. However, of more obvious relevance to consumer protection are 
consequentialist theories.106 These justify punishment on the basis of the need to change 
the defendant (or at least, the defendant’s conduct). Where regulatory offences are 
concerned, changing behaviour is perhaps the principal aim of prosecution (or, indeed, 
other forms of penalty). This might be conceived in different ways. For example, we 
might punish in order to deter the trader from engaging in similar conduct in future 
(individual deterrence) or in order to deter others from committing similar wrongdoing 
(general deterrence). It might be argued in some cases that punishment has a role in 
rehabilitation, although this is likely to be rare.107  
There are significant concerns with the notion of deterrence in the narrow sense 
of deterring someone from deliberately breaking the law. Regulatory Justice focused of 
course on the shortcomings of prosecution for regulatory offences and there is no doubt 
that prosecution (and in particular, the consequences of being prosecuted) were 
inadequate. The importance of enforcers providing “credible deterrence” has come 
particularly to the fore in some areas, such as financial regulation.108 The need to deter 
substantial wrongdoers is also recognized by the Government’s reference to “out and out 
rogues”. It is also worth noting, that since subsections (1), (2) and (4) of s. 85 of the 
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Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 were brought into force (on 
12th March 2015)  magistrates’ courts have not been restricted to specified upper limits 
when deciding the level fine to impose upon defendants. This will apply to some pieces 
of consumer protection legislation. It means that at least in some cases, it is possible for 
the courts to impose penalties that are more likely both to deter, and to reflect the 
degree of wrongdoing involved.  
As has been recognized, some traders are amoral calculators, incentivised to 
comply only by the credible threat of a compelling sanction.109 There seems to be broad 
agreement that deterrence, achieved through the criminal law, has a role in dealing with 
such traders. But a number of caveats should be added. First, it is far from clear that 
enforcers will be inclined to prosecute even where there is evidence of mens rea. The 
push towards moving cases from criminal to civil courts is likely to mean that some 
cases which involve high levels of culpability are diverted away from the criminal 
process. Second, there is a compelling argument that threatening prosecution focuses 
the minds of traders and incentivises them to take greater care, and to devote more 
resources to checking, monitoring, supervising, and training. This has been seen as a 
rationale for regulatory offences. In the Trade Descriptions case of Wings v Ellis, Lord 
Scarman famously said that the point of prosecution was not the enforcement of the law 
so much as the maintenance of trading standards.110 It has been recognized that when 
the criminal law is used against businesses, its purpose includes the encouraging of good 
practice.111 Consumer protection offences are examples of regulatory offences which 
incentivise care by being subject to due diligence defences. A trader who has done all 
that he or she reasonable could to avoid the commission of the offence is not guilty. 
Some of this risks being lost in the move away from the prosecution. It is hoped, of 
course, that the wish to avoid ECMs will also encourage good practice. It should also be 
remembered that informal enforcement takes place against the background of the threat 
of more formal action. It may be that knowledge on the part of traders that enforcers 
can prosecute, and courts can impose ECMs will focus the minds of traders on their 
obligations. But the obstacles placed in the way of formal action make this less of threat 
than it might be. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
There is little doubt that the ability of the courts and of enforcers to secure positive 
outcomes for consumers is strengthened by the creation of ECMs. The weaknesses of 
relying on the prosecution of traders and the seeking of undertakings and enforcement 
orders to deliver the aims of consumer protection law are well-established; at least some 
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of these weaknesses are addressed directly by the ability of enforcers to pursue ECMs. 
Macrory identified two of the weaknesses of regulatory offences as their inadequate 
focus on the victim and their tendency to lead to a compliance deficit.112 Redress 
measures will assist enforcers in obtaining redress (and in particular compensation) for 
consumers where other tools impose barriers, thus allowing greater focus on the 
interests of the victim. Compliance measures should address compliance deficit by 
making it easier for enforcers to procure agreements from, and the courts to impose 
requirements on, traders, thus reducing the probability of future contravention. Choice 
measures will not only allow for the dissemination of information that is likely to improve 
consumer decision-making but will also provide a further incentive for traders both to 
choose to comply in the first place, and to choose to take care to avoid careless breaches 
that might lead to negative publicity. Although ECMs are not generally conceived as 
sanctions or penalties, they may operate as such in some cases. To the extent that they 
do, they may sometimes operate more successfully as a deterrent, and better reflect the 
stigma that should attach to a particular contravention, than would prosecution. The 
existence of ECMs means that enforcers will sometimes be able to negotiate better 
outcomes for consumers who have suffered detriment, while putting in place measures 
to reduce the chances of conduct being repeated.  
Despite these advances, concerns remain. The procedural obstacles that 
enforcers face will frequently make it difficult for them to achieve optimal outcomes.  It 
is disappointing that rather than overcome these obstacles, the changes may have in 
some respects have increased them. It is extremely important that prosecution can be 
used alongside ECMs. Had they been alternatives, as was originally mooted, enforcers 
would have found themselves in the undesirable position of choosing between the 
seeking of positive outcomes for consumers, and the imposition of an appropriate 
penalty upon a wrongdoer. Typically, this would be a choice between restoration or 
retribution when both were demanded. Despite what was said above about the potential 
for an ECM to sometimes operate in a manner similar to a punishment, they are no 
substitute for prosecution where the seriousness of a transgression justifies that 
response. However, it is important not only that enforcers can pursue prosecution where 
that is the most fitting response, but that they do so. The Government’s reluctance to 
see these actions being taken in combination may still translate into cases which deserve 
prosecution being diverted from the criminal courts. This is regrettable in terms of 
appropriate labelling, but also from an instrumental perspective, as it may reduce the 
ability of the law to incentivise compliance. In this regard the changes introduced by the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 can be seen as both a step forward and a step backwards. 
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